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The  proposed work is  incorporated  into  the  research  theme  concerning  the  maintenance  and  inspection
of  sensitive  facilities in production  systems.  It  is essential  to  promote  the  methodological  deployment
of  inspection  techniques  to  ensure  the  good  functioning  of  services  provided  by  complex  production
systems  as well  as their  different  components.  We  use  a risk-based inspection  methodology  offering
an  organized  analysis  with  knowledge  sharing  for  collaborative  possibilities  in a  multidisciplinary  con-
text  and it consists  of  the  following  steps: data  acquisition  and  information  collection,  failure  analysis
(probability  and consequences),  risk  assessment,  inspection  plan,  mitigation  and  revaluation.  The appli-
cation  of  this methodology  can  improve  the  maintenance  management  strategies  of  industrial  companies.
The  inspection  department  is able  to forecast  its potential  failure, root  causes  and impacts  on the  safe
operation  of  the  considered  production  system,  based  on a  reliable inventory  of  existing  situations  and
review  options  for  continuous  improvement  in  maintenance  management.  In  particular,  we addressed
the  application  of  a Risk-Based  Inspection  (RBI)  methodology  in the  French petroleum  company  with
operations  on the  west coast  of  central  and  southern  Africa.  The incorporation  of  expert  knowledge  into
risk  assessment  is helping  to  find the  best  preventive  plan  for  pipeline  inspection  in the  case  study.
1. Introduction
The current management frameworks of industrial enterprises
must integrate engineering standards and recommended practices
to reflect the increasing complexity of  production systems. In addi-
tion, the legislation requires that enterprises comply with appli-
cable normative rules by  using industrial practices that are  envi-
ronmentally and logistically sustainable. In certain circumstances,
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the law obliges companies to make risk information (threat cryp-
tograms and the associated risk  and safety descriptions) available
on the industrial sites. The increasing complexity of  oil and gas
installations and operations, along with growing public awareness
to ensure higher levels of safety, has put  great pressure on the
designers and operators to find innovative solutions to ensure safe
as well as economically viable operation [1]. Reliability and Main-
tenance with tools such as  RCM  (Reliability Centred Maintenance)
and RBI (Risk-Based Inspection) contribute to  collaboratively work-
ing towards seeking reasonable and practical solutions in  the indus-
trial settings [2]. In  scientific literature, there are  different cate-
gories of  risk analysis and risk-assessment methods and techniques
(qualitative, quantitative and hybrid approaches) [3]. A varied
range of methodologies presently in use for risk-based inspection
includes marketable and internal software packages particular to
explicit plants [4]. In the complex production systems, the work
package of  maintenance engineering is important to ensure conti-
nuity of  services, optimize production capacity, improve safety and
reduce the environmental impact. Risk Based Inspection (RBI) is an
interesting maintenance perspective with an  incremental stepwise
procedure used to examine sensitive equipment such as pressure
vessels, heat  exchangers and piping in complex industrial plants
[5]. RBI provides a modelling process for organizations to con-
trol its reliability, safety and health aspects, ensure maintenance
compliance and to  iteratively improve the technical performance
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and cost of  projects [6]. However, the implementation of  the
RBI requires structured and coherent information management in
order to maximize its integration in the target computerized man-
agement information system for maintenance and inspection. The
aim of this work is  to propose a conceptual approach providing
structured information for semantic modelling of the hierarchi-
cal organization of  components that characterize all the sensitive
areas of  a  complex system that must be inspected or verified by  the
RBI method. This semantic modelling will formalize the taxonomic
organization of equipment and instruments of  the considered sys-
tem. These components are classified according to their nature
through the study of  essential documents and information pro-
vided by  vendors and the manufacturer of  the system. The obtained
structured information can be transferred to the Computerized
Maintenance and Inspection Management System (CMIMS) for the
management issues (analysis and diagnosis) or engineering issues
(task lists).
The paper is  structured as  followed. Section 2 exposes a
background of the risk based inspection management. Section 3
presents the industrial challenge of  the risk based inspection man-
agement. Section 4  presents the suggested methodology. Section
5.1 describes an  illustrative case study for petroleum pipelines. Sec-
tion 5.2 delivers an  analysis of  this study. Sections 6  and 7  presents
the results and discussion based on research findings. Finally, Sec-
tion 8  gives the conclusion and underlines both the related works
and the challenges that lay ahead.
2. Background
2.1. Practices of risk-based inspection
Risk-based Inspection (RBI) offers practical ways for the imple-
mentation of an inspection process that provides to maintenance
actors a  method of  assessing the probability and effect of  failure,
evaluating risk level and generating the kinds of relevant actions
that can lead to  development of  required risk management policies
[7]. There are different illustrations of RBI practices which increase
cost effective actions and can be considered as  promising develop-
ments to shift from a  reactive to a proactive maintenance manage-
ment in  various domains. We mention as  examples the implemen-
tation of risk assessment in  civil engineering applications [8]. In the
petrochemical and chemical industries, the deployment of  online
and offline inspection procedures to equipment such as  pipelines
has led to substantial improvements in operational reliability and
the prevention of  incidents (e.g. Management of  Corrosion) [9,10].
In nuclear engineering and design, there are current practices and
trends in the risk-based inspection and maintenance for safety
evaluation [11].  The RBI method was used to assess the risk of  large-
scale crude oil tanks in order to determine the acceptable risk and
internal inspection interval of  tanks [12]. There are some exam-
ples of the application of risk-based methods in industrial coal-fired
boilers with some interesting results [13]. RBI programmes are also
established for reliability analysis purposes in  heavy water plants
with the assessment of failure pressure and estimation of the fron-
tier state functional analysis [14]. The RBI methods are also adopted
and useful in the  offshore wind energy industry for the organization
of maintenance logistics with significant influences on important
cost  parameters of energy production [15–17].
In general, the  majority of industrial applications of RBI method-
ologies are used in the refinery systems and petrochemical sectors
[18]. RBI addresses clearly the threats (personnel death and injury,
damage to the environment and financial loss) to the integrity
of the asset and it is performed for piping and vessels, including
heat exchangers, tanks, pressure vessels, and filters [19]. Pipeline
system inspections can be  done either internally or externally as
continuous inspections over the complete pipeline length or as local
inspections for particular sections or local zones in  order [20]:
• In-Line inspections (ILI) of  pipelines are generally accomplished
using a pig. The pig moves through the pipeline guided by the
flow or fluid or may be  pulled by  a  vehicle or  a  cable. It  gathers
data as  it turns through the pipeline. The technical resources may
be automatic or self-contained or may be activated from outside
the pipeline via  a  data and power connexion. Diverse technical
resources can be combined in a  pig train. The internal inspection
techniques comprises Magnetic Flux Leakage, Ultrasound Tech-
nology (UT),  Laser-optical inspection tool, Geopig and Calliper.
• External inspections are  generally accomplished using a  remotely
operated transporter equipped with diverse inspection tech-
niques and resources. This can for instance be techniques for
visual inspections (video recording) and physical measurements
(steel electrochemical voltage measurements). External inspec-
tion can also  be accomplished by  a  diving team. The external
inspection techniques comprises Visual/Video/photo, sidescan
sonar (SOund NAvigation Ranging), Multibeam Echosounder
(MBE), Cross profiler, Pipetracker, Sub bottom profiler, Stabbing,
Eddy Current and External UT (Ultrasonic Testing).
The scope of  these inspections methods encompasses all pres-
sure systems in  the industrial site, and they  can be used to
inspect pipes/other static equipment and take the geometric mea-
surements (diameter, wall thickness, metal loss, crack and other
defects). The selection of inspection method is  based on opti-
mizing a  number of  features that symbolize each technique: (i)
Confidence in  identifying the estimated damage state, (ii) Cost  of
technique/method, including human and technical resources, and
(iii) Magnitude of maintenance support necessary to perform the
work (scaffolding, process shutdown, opening of equipment).
2.2. Principles for risk evaluation
The RBI evaluation is used to engender an inspection plan
at desired detail level of  the considered system with adequate
time allowing to not exceeded the risk limit, to keep track of
degradation processes with the potential selection of the appro-
priate mitigation action. Risk acceptance limits for inspection plan
ning resulting from main targets related to availability, profit and
safety can imply pure maintenance engineering acceptance criteria
such as acceptable wall thickness (requirement for pressure retain-
ing purposes). The risk evaluation is  based on consequences and
probabilities of failures that are evaluated in  a  distinct way, under
the  following assumptions [21]:
• The consequences of system faults, loss of  main functions and
sub-functions, are independent of  the equipment carrying out
the functions.
• The actual equipment and the operational conditions affect the
probability of  failure.
The outcome of  the RBI process is  determination of  [22]:
• location and extent of  inspections and condition monitoring,
• inspection methods,
• inspection intervals.
The consequences of  main function failures are evaluated
according to  the effect on the enterprise, activity sector, industrial
site and system level regarding the production loss and direct cost
measured in interruption and economic terms, while consequences
of impairment of health and environmental degradation are
Table  1
General consequence classification [21].
Class Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) Production Cost (exclusive production loss)
High Potential for serious personnel injuries.
Render safety critical systems inoperable.
Potential for fire in classified areas.
Potential for large pollution.
Stop in production/significant reduced rate
of  production exceeding X hours (specify
duration) within a  defined period of time.
Substantial cost –  exceeding Y  NOK
(specify  cost limit)
Medium Potential for injuries requiring medical treatment.
Limited effect on safety systems.
No potential for fire  in classified areas.
Potential for moderate pollution.
Brief stop in production/reduced rate of
production lasting less than X hours
(specify duration) within a defined period
of  time.
Moderate cost between Z–Y NOK
(specify cost limits)
Low  No potential for injuries.
No potential for fire  or effect on safety systems.
No  potential for pollution (specify limit)
No effect on production within a  defined
period of time.
Insignificant cost less than Z NOK
(specify cost limit)
Table 2
The classification of  equipment according their technological complexity.
Technological complexity Low  Medium High
Equipment
Static equipment
without instruments
Low speed rotary equipment (speed ≤3000 rpm) High speed rotary equipment (speed >3000 rpm)
Pipelines  Vertical pumps (power <500 kW) All  compressors
Storage tanks Control and safety valves Gas turbines
Incinerators Electrical components (voltage <400 V) Rotary hydraulic equipment
.  . . Instrumentation Electrical components (voltage >400 V)
classified with  regard to predetermined consequence categories
and approval criteria.
Concerning the evaluation of  failure probabilities, this is
indirectly expressed by the maintenance characteristics and
operational experiences. Essentially, the equipment failure modes,
operational conditions, location and external environmental fac-
tors are fundamental elements contributing to  the calculation of
the probabilities of failure according to the functions the equip-
ment supports and applicable generic maintenance concepts. These
generic concepts are issued from the collection of best practices
of maintenance actions, strategies and maintenance details (e.g.
structured analysis identifying failure modes and failure causes)
for an enterprise.
The general consequence classification (defined in Table 1) is
made in accordance with criteria for Health, safety and environ-
ment (HSE), Production and Cost (exclusive production loss)
The consequence classification methodology is applied for cat-
egorizing of  static mechanical equipment with the purpose of
selecting critical equipment for further analysis and prioritizes
them for  in-depth risk evaluations as the basis for preparation of
inspection and maintenance programmes.
The technology of  equipment is a factor influencing mainte-
nance activities. Therefore it is possible to classify equipment
according to  the technological complexity needed to execute the
maintenance engineering. Some examples of equipment classified
according to their technological complexity are provided in  Table 2.
3. Industrial challenge
In general, the  maintenance and inspection activities are con-
ducted in  compliance with the considered enterprise policy with
the following objectives:
• Safety and health of personnel and facilities
• Care for the environment
• Sustained operation and performance of the installations over
time
• Maintain asset integrity
• Retained investment capital value of plant and structures
• Compliance with applicable local legislation
The purpose of inspection activities is  to  establish a  basis for
preparation and optimization of  maintenance plans for industrial
sites. The principles of  risk analysis are essential for selection
and prioritization of relevant types of  site equipment and associ-
ated maintenance activities. For instance, the risk assessment and
inspection process can be focused on static process equipment in
industrial facilities, due technical or functional declines.
The process-based inspection requires knowledge of  the follow-
ing elements [22]:
• damage mechanism which depends on material properties, inter-
nal fluid compositions and the external operational environment
–  influential the probability of failure,
• consequence of leak failure with respect to personnel, environ-
ment damages and financial losses.
The combination of  the above characterizes the risk of  failure
requiring the reduction or  mitigation of associated consequences
within the industrial system.
In  particular, the work package of inspection provides the enter-
prise inspection team with the documents for the definition of
the inspection strategy, programme and plan for each of  the sys-
tems. For  each document, some information is needed: TAG number
(document number), supplier document number, title, kind of doc-
ument (drawing, data sheet, supplier manual, etc.) and disciplines
(mechanical, electrical, inspection, fabric maintenance, instrumen-
tation, methods and maintenance engineering).
In order to  make the description of an  hierarchical arrangement
of system components, the following documents are useful:
• Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID): a  P&ID is a  diagram
that defines all the elements of  a chemical process. The P&ID con-
tains the instruments, equipment, valves and others with their
designations.
• Process Flow Diagram (PFD): a PFD is a diagram used to describe
the main components of  a  chemical process. Only equipment in
direct contact with the chemical products and the transportation
thereof (pumps, hoses, etc.) are represented.
• Utility Flow Diagram (UFD): the same principle as  the PFD.
• Lay-out (LAY): the LAY is a drawing of  the equipment.
• Single-Line Diagram (SLD): a SLD provides a  basic understanding
of the functions of the components of  a  system. Its  vision is  very
simplified.
• Electrical Schematic Diagram (ESD): an  ESD is  a  graphic repre-
sentation of an electrical circuit. It  shows the circuit components
in  the form of standardized symbols, as well as  power and signals
between these components.
• Equipment list. It identifies all the equipment that is  present in
the P&ID,  PFD, UFD, LAY, SLD  and ESD.
3.1. Hierarchical arrangement for the preparation of inspection
and maintenance
The proper documentation and classification of the categories,
characteristics, and interrelationships of the objects that actually
or primarily exist for a specific application field is recognized as
an important and fundamental activity in support of  the imple-
mentation of  the  information modelling [23]. The hierarchical
arrangement of  different subset and elements of a  target system
can be useful in association with making selections as  to how the
inspection planning process is  to be expressed and formalized. The
level of  detailing may be augmented for the high-risk functions and
related subsystems and elements. It  possible to establish the func-
tional hierarchy and the technical hierarchy of  system elements
(e.g. part, component, pipe or equipment) that  can be character-
ized by a  unique identification (i.e. a  tag number) allowing the
traceability of  inspection and maintenance processes.
3.1.1. Technical hierarchy
The technical hierarchy is  the foundation on which an  effec-
tive inspection programme and maintenance management should
be built. It defines the technical structure of  the industrial site by
describing functional locations with unique identifiers. The tech-
nical hierarchy offers an  outline of  equipment units belonging to
the same technical group, and indicates the physical relationship
between main equipment, instruments, valves, etc. The goal of  the
technical hierarchy is as follows:
• display technical interdependencies of  the installation;
• extraction of  tags, equipment and spare parts;
• extraction of documents and drawings;
• extraction of historical inspection and maintenance data from
Computerized Maintenance and Inspection Management System
(CMIMS);
• scheduling of  operations (e.g. relationships due to  shutdown
etc.);
• cost allocation and extraction;
• scheduling and organization of the inspection and maintenance
programme;
• scheduling of  corrective work.
Technical drawings (e.g. flow and one-line diagrams, P&IDs, etc.)
can be  used to classify packages and main equipment that can serve
as  a  superior tag for the linked instruments, valves and other types
of  equipment. The level on which the inspection and maintenance
objects are established is directed by practical considerations (e.g.
traceability, consequence classification and costing analysis) and
the  different needs (preventive and corrective actions) to  super-
vise and check the different inspection activities and maintenance
programmes.
3.1.2. Functional hierarchy
The functional hierarchy is a  logical diagram connecting all the
industrial site functions characterized as functional units or main
functions and sub functions. The level of  detailing of the functional
hierarchy may  vary, but typically 4  to  5 levels are sufficient. Sub
functions are connected to equipment/maintenance object in the
technical hierarchy.
Each equipment within one sub function is given the equiva-
lent classification because a  fault, error or failure on any of  these
equipment (identified by  the tag numbers) will cause the identical
consequence on the main function.
The breakdown by activity sector shows that the components
of  systems in the industrial site are classified in the functional
hierarchy organized in  a  tree  with different levels (from level 1
system to  various sub-Tag levels). We can see below the levels of
the described hierarchy (Fig. 1).
The contents of various levels of  the functional hierarchy are
described in Table 3.
Fig. 1. An example of  the functional hierarchy.
Table  3
The contents of  various levels of the functional hierarchy.
Level 1 Site The site is a  geographical location of  the equipment. For  example, project facilities ‘CLOV’ are located in block 17 with  the code ‘CLO’.
Level  2 Sector The sector describes a  set of the process system. This  corresponds to a  single installation section. For example for CLOV, we have the
following  description.
Code Designation Description
FPSOT Topside All  that is on  the deck of  the FPSO
FPSOH Hull Inside the shell
FPSOA Accommodation The living quarters
BUOY Buoy Buoy of loading operations
SUB  Subsea Underwater workplaces
Level 3 System A  system is a  set of interdependent equipment sharing common functional characteristics. For example, the treatment of water from
the  injection wells comprises all functional handling units contributing to the injection of  water: filtration, treatment and injection.
Level  4 Unit A  set of  equipment dedicated to a specific process or a  utility function (for example, water filtration within the water treatment
system). A  unit is  a  part of  the installation which is operatively independent. It is  also an entity which may be controlled. The unit is
identified by a  code of  the subsystems.
Level 5 Main Tag The tag represents a  unique functional identification of  a device in a  site. All  equipment subject to  maintenance, inspection or
certification must be tag (e.g. pumps, boats, boilers and, vessels). Tags are defined mainly during the engineering phase and are listed
on  the following project documents: P&ID, PFD, UFD and Equipment List.
Level 6 Sub-Tag This concerns the  creation of  other sub-levels from the main-tag. The sub-tags can facilitate the  description of  instruments to  identify.
An  instrument, such as a  pressure transmitter, is always connected to an  automated control and safety. The instruments belong to one
of  the following categories:
• Process Control System (PCS) (e.g. electronic modules, Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), Human–machine interface (HMI)).
•  Process Safety System (PSS) (e.g. valves and actuators).
• Process Control Instrumentation (e.g. gauges, detectors, indicators, transmitters, switches).
The structural description of  the organization of  the functional
hierarchy is further complemented by  the functional descriptions
about key features and capabilities of the equipment. This can
help the manager to possibly set alternatives that could determine
the characteristics and settings that are available [24–26]. There-
fore, the user can consult this technical annotation on an  organized
source for  any  updated information regarding the functional
descriptions, e.g. methanol storage drum control devices, methanol
storage drum level transmitter or nitrogen supply shutdown valve
of equipment and instruments are the components of  the system
under study in a petroleum project. These functional descriptions
are really helpful in practical ways in working with repair and over-
haul services, parts provisioning, support services and engineering
services.
3.2. Maintenance packages and routes
In addition, using the list of equipment, the maintenance pack-
ages can be  prepared by simply assigning groups to each of  the input
components based on factors such as  functionality, ergonomics or
criticality [27]. In the context of  petroleum activities, a  package is  a
set of equipment handling the same main fluid and/or dedicated to
a specific process function. A package is a  portion of an  industrial
facility that has  a maximum of  operational autonomy. It is also an
entity that could be commissioned and dismantled to facilitate a
reorganization or  a safety issue.
Some typical packages identified are listed below:
• Gas Compressor package: Compressor/Motors (electric)/Electric
heaters/Instrumentation/Valves (Manual and Actuated)/Control
Panel.
• Pump  package: Pump with sealing and cooling system/High-
Voltage (HV) –  Low-Voltage (LV) electric Motors/Electric
heaters/Instrumentation/Valves (Manual and Actuated)/Control
Panel.
• Combustion Engine package: Diesel Engine with air starting
system, radiator (cooling)/Electrical Generator/Instrumentation/
Valves (Manual and Actuated)/Control Panel.
• Boiler package: Boiler/Control and monitoring system/
Instrumentation/Control and safety valves.
• Vessels package: Control and monitoring system/
Instrumentation/Control and safety valves.
A route is a  sequence of similar equipment, combined to simplify
maintenance tasks. There are three  different types of  route:
• Route type 1: Applied on a unique area, unit or zone. This equip-
ment often belongs to  the same technical class which means that
the work to perform would be  the same.
• Route Type 2:  Applied on multiple areas, units or zones.
• Individual Equipment: Applied on unique equipment, indepen-
dently of  the rest.
The next step is  to  use  functional descriptions more effectively
to  improve criticality analyses and Risk-Based Inspection methods.
4.  Methodology
In contrast to the systems in  onshore production sites, systems
in offshore production sites operate in extremely difficult condi-
tions, e.g. water, air  and other aspects of the natural and human
environment. We apply the risk based inspection to all pipelines
(onshore and offshore) and risers operated by subsidiaries of the
French petroleum company with operations on  the west coast of
central and southern Africa. This covers the following categories of
pipelines and risers:
• The offshore steel pipelines,
• The onshore steel pipelines,
• The static steel risers,
• The steel catenary risers.
In this context, the objectives of  the application of  the Risk based
Inspection Methodology are the following:
• Listing of  the facilities operated within a  production centre to
identify potential failure modes and high-risk areas.
• Estimation of the value of  the risks associated with the opera-
tions of each device in a production cluster, based on a consistent
methodology.
• Organization of  appropriate inspection plans resulting from the
identification of potential failure modes and risk assessment.
• Development of mechanical changes, both to  the processes and
operations that would reduce the risks.
Data and  informatio n
colle ctio n
Con sequenc e
of failur e
Probability 
of failur e
Risk
ranking
Inspection 
plan
Mitigation 
(if any)
Rea ssess ment  
Risk asse sment  proce ss
Fig. 2. The risk based inspection organization process [39].
Fig. 2 highlights the methodology for risk based inspection.
This methodology requires achievement of  seven main activities
encompassing data and information collection, risk assessment pro-
cess composed of  probability of failure rating  and consequence of
failure rating, risk  ranking in risk matrix, inspection plan, mitiga-
tion (in case of need) and re-assessment [28]. This methodology
is normally used to  define a  risk based inspection plan itera-
tively.
The risk matrix is  interesting for engagement in mainte-
nance preparation, inspection programming and for ordering work
orders. It  is possible to use a variable number of classes for conse-
quences as  for probabilities. For example, the widely used risk scale
(low, medium, high) or  the colour scheme (red, yellow, green) of
equipment provide means to visual identification of risk acceptance
criteria (e.g. unacceptable, undesirable, acceptable, negligible) with
the emphasis placed on priority areas of  intervention.
An example of a risk matrix (using probabilities of  failures and
consequences of failure) is  shown in Fig. 3.  This risk matrix displays
three risk levels, indicated through colour coding:
• Green – Low risk – Risk is acceptable. Generally, action needs to
be taken to  guarantee that risk remains within this acceptable
region; normally this involves operator round, cleaning, general
visual inspections to check that there have been no alterations in
equipment condition.
• Yellow –  Medium risk – Risk is  acceptable. Action (such as
Non-Destructive Testing, functional tests and other condition
monitoring processes) should be  taken to measure extent of
Fig. 3.  Example of  the description of a  coloured risk matrix [40].
Table  4
Relevant data  concerning the internal part of pipelines.
Depth Internal part of  pipeline External part of  pipeline Total
In  body of  pipe Weld area In body of pipe Weld area
≥70% – – – – –
60%  to <70% 1 – – – 1
50%  to <60% 1 – – – 1
40%  to <50% 5 2 – – 7
30%  to <40% 20  21  – – 41
20%  to <30% 59 23  – – 82
10%  to <20% 357 7 – – 364
Total  443 53  – – 496
degradation so that action can be taken to guarantee risks do not
rise  into the red high-risk region.
• Red –  High  risk – Risk level is  unacceptable. Action must be taken
to reduce probability, consequence or both, so that risk remains
in the acceptable region.
The implementation of  the RBI therefore needs to collect all
the data; type of  equipment, the material used, the operating con-
ditions, safety systems, the cost of  failure etc., related to subsea
pipeline production and injection of  water and gas production
centres on an Excel file  to create a dynamic database. This is  the
first step and the most important part  of  the methodology as it
will define the quality of inspection plans. Therefore, one has to
understand the types of information required, thickness, length,
operating pressure, maximum allowed pressure, etc., and their
influence on the results. In  addition a  permanent judgement on
values and information found is necessary in order to avoid pos-
sible errors. The collection of  information for the development of
RBI must ensure the access to industrial databases that contain all
the information related to  each defined business, production site
or projects (production line drawings, technical documents, plans,
alignment sheets with geographic coordinates and system spec-
ifications). For each RBI plan, two  types of  information, specific
or generic, can be identified. On the one hand, some information
is specific, for the pipeline identification, the following informa-
tion is used: section identification, section function, coupling type,
presence of thermal insulation, nominal thickness, shore approach,
overpressure protection system, safety factor thickness, quality
control (manufacturing), fabrication type, construction code status,
pipeline crossing, elevation, rock dumping, diameter, Maximum
Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) and Maximum Operating
Pressure (MOP). On the other hand, certain information is generic
e.g. for the detection system available, the following information is
used: material grade, climate, shipping lane/traffic maritime area,
anchorage zone,  fishing trawling activities, presence of  iceberg,
cargo activity, seismic area, fault crossing, coastal or fragile sys-
tem area and deep  offshore. They are the same for all the poles?
of production, because the pipelines are located in  an area where
there is no sea traffic, icebergs, or earthquakes, as  all pipelines are
in deep offshore. All  information on the working environment of
these subsea components have much more influence on inspection
intervals.
The organization and verification of  technical data are two nec-
essary steps in  any data collection activity for the sake of  clarity,
coherence and consistency of  information sources [29]. In order
to facilitate the exchange of information on maintenance and
inspection management the Excel form is  widely used to enter
information into the data collection system and such information
may be exported to  various other programmes such as Systems,
Applications & Products in Data Processing (SAP), among others.
5.  Analysis
5.1. Situation of internal part of petroleum pipelines
We are interested here only in  the internal portion of  the
pipelines. There are two points of  corrosion by  more than 50% deep.
The nominal wall thickness is  17.5 [mm] which can be reduced up
to 50 [%] as  a  result of corrosion.
The corrosion rate is calculated from thickness data available
from equipment inspections. In total there are 492 points of corro-
sion with varying depths below 70% (as described in Table 4).
The equivalent allowed maximum depth is 80%. Table 4  shows
certain relevant data concerning the internal part of pipelines. The
data presented in  this table are real and they  are collected by intel-
ligent pigging that is  a  highly sophisticated instrument measuring
pipeline wall thickness and metal loss by direct measurement of
the thickness of  the pipeline wall.
After the first inspection of  the internal part of  pipelines,
corrosion is  found with a  dense and regular distribution of  the dete-
rioration at the base and along the internal parts. The inspection of
pipelines can detect metal loss and corrosion through electromag-
netic waves.
The corrosion rate is calculated from thickness data available
from equipment inspections. However, if corrosion rates cannot be
determined from thickness inspection data, conservative estimates
may be established using expert opinions from knowledgeable
materials. The maximum corrosion depth in body of pipe is  based
on Table 4 for the presence of one occurrence in the interval 60% to
<70% (0.64 * 17.5 =  11.2 mm). The result is a conservative value for
the estimated corrosion rate, but it is  not  always the case. There is
a  clear distinction between corrosion rates in  body and weld area.
The maximum corrosion depth in weld area is based on Table 4
for the presence of two occurrences in the interval 40% to <50%
(0.50 *  17.5 =  8.75 mm).
5.2. The realization of the implementation plan
Step 1: the identification of the probability of failure to  estab-
lish a risk matrix. In  the general, the probability of  failure can be
determined as  a linear combination of  corrosion (i.e. environment)
and structural induced failure. The weights used in the linear com-
bination depend on the contextual assumptions and inspection
techniques that are used in the risk based inspection methodology.
In the considered context, it is assumed that corrosion (i.e. environ-
ment) and structural induced failure have an equitable contribution
to  pipeline failure. In addition, CL and SL are levels of  probability
which are in  between the numbers 1  and 5, 1  ≤ CL ≤ 5  and 1  ≤ SL ≤ 5
then 1  ≤ 0.5 *  CL +  0.5 * SL ≤ 5.
The level of probability is  given by the following formula:
Likelihood of failure (Lof) = 50% CL + 50% SL.
• Corrosion Likelihood (CL) is  used to estimate the corrosion and
Structure Likelihood (SL) is used to estimate the structural fail-
ure (construction, design, mechanical and others). The severity
of events is specified with probability levels describing five lev-
els of probability which are in  between the numbers 1  and 5, with
1 being the lowest and 5  being the highest: 1-Very Low, 2-Low,
3-Moderate, 4-High and 5-Very High.
• CL = NCL − EFF − ST
• Natural Corrosion Likelihood (NCL): the probability level of
natural corrosion (without mitigation).
• Effectiveness (EFF): the level of  effectiveness of mitigations
or maintenance if there were.
• State (ST): the internal state of the pipeline due to the corro-
sion.
• In order to find the NCL, one must calculate the ratio of the
Corrosion Rate (CR)  and the Allowed minimum THickness (Ath),
with:
• CR = maximum depth of  corrosion/age of  the
pipeline = 11.2/8 =  1.4 mm/year.
• Ath =  it is calculated by  multiplying the allowed maxi-
mum depth by the nominal value (allowed maximum
depth × nominal value). In  the case study Ath is 80% of the
nominal value. Ath =  0.8 *  17.5 =  14  mm.
• So, Ath/CR =  10  mm/mm/year.
• This ratio of  10  mm/mm/year corresponds to a NCL  =  4.
• For the EFF, the value is  zero (=0), because there  was no miti-
gation, maintenance, nor inspection.
• The ST is the maximum percentage of metal lost so far, 64%.
• So to conclude CL =  4.0 −  0.64 = 3.36. During the calculations of
the probability level of  failure and risk level, the results are
generally rounded upwards, so we will take a rounding value
with CL = 4.
• SL =  (SLmec + SLD/C) +  SLthird +  SLnat
• Structural mechanical failure Likehood (SLmec) =  it corresponds
to the probability level of a  mechanical failure.
• Structural design or construction failure Likehood (SLD/C)  =  it
corresponds to the probability level of  a  failure in the design or
construction.
• Structural failure third party Likehood (SLthird)  =  it is the prob-
ability level of  a  failure due to an  external event.
• Structural natural failure Likehood (SLnat) =  it is the probability
level of  a failure caused by  the natural environment.
• SLnat and SLthird are zero values because there has never been a
failure caused by the environment or by  an external event. Also
no failure in the design nor construction have been identified
and no mechanical failure has been observed since the putting
into operation of  this production site.
• The assessment of the facility’s management system evalua-
tion consists of  a  series of  interviews with plant management,
operations, inspection, maintenance, engineering, training, and
safety personnel [30]. As regards the process safety informa-
tion, one  should address the question regarding the quality
control procedures in place and practiced to ensure that all
identified materials meet specifications when received and
used.
• However, none of these failures are indicated because there was
nothing observed, and in  the absence of any other information
to the contrary, it was assumed that the value of  the variable SL
is  the lowest possible value i.e. SL = 1.
Finally, we have Lof = 50%CL +  50%SL =  2  + 0.5 =  2.5. This result is
rounded upwards, so we will take a  rounding value with Lof =  3.
Step 2: the calculation of  the consequence of  failure is classified
on a  scale ranging from 1 to 5. There are three types of  conse-
quences: the staff safety, environmental impact and pollution, with
the financial and economic impact. The scale of  the consequence is
Table 5
Relations between production loss and financial consequence.
Production loss Financial
consequence
Production loss >5 days of affiliates average production 5
Loss between 1 and 5 days of  affiliates average production 4
Loss  less than 1 day  of  affiliates average production 3
Limited loss 2
Negligible production loss 1
given by  the following formula:
Consequence of  the failure (Cof)
=  MAX [pollution; financial consequences;  personnel safety]
For the Cof, we take the highest value among the three conse-
quences. In order to  determine the severity of  the consequences
and therefore the level of  risk, we made some assumptions about
the  possible failure modes and we  took the one with the highest
probability level and criticality. The assumptions are:
• The pressure of the water is approximately 140 bars and the pres-
sure of the operations (inside) is  about 60 bars in  the presence of
a hole, this means therefore that the sea water enters the flow-
line due to the pressure difference. So  there is  no pollution, no
impact environmental, no financial loss and no danger to  per-
sonnel safety.
• When production is shut down on the right section, one can
switch the entire production on  the left line thus avoiding finan-
cial consequences. But  however many operations occur. To switch
the production on the left line, one must know its capacity to
receive the entire production of the right line. All these param-
eters can decrease oil  production capacity significantly, so there
will be significant financial consequences.
• The considered section of  the production site is  in subsea
and away from the Floating Production, Storage and Offloading
(FPSO), therefore the consequences for direct personnel safety is
zero.
In our context, we  will always take the most unfavourable case
for the calculation of different consequences, this means that we
must stop the production activities in this particular petroleum
site. So  in this case, there are financial consequences. In practice
it  includes the losses generated by  the production loss that is less
than 1 day of  affiliates average production. As it can be inferred from
Fig. 4. Example of  risk matrix used  for the case study.
Fig. 5. Experience model incorporating problem-solving technique [23].
Table 5, with respect to  the financial consequence, the criticality
coefficient has the value Cof =  3.
The overall level of risk of  the studied pipeline (including prob-
ability level of corrosion and the probability level of  a  structure
failure) in the considered production site is  calculated by  the fol-
lowing formula:
Global Risk = Likelihood (Global Probability)
×  Consequence (Severity)  = Lof ∗  Cof = 3  ∗ 3  = 9
6. Results
The definition of  inspection intervals by using relevant devices
to perform various inspection operations on a pipeline. Particularly,
intelligent devices are very smart instrument devices that contain
electronics and sensors that gather several forms of data during
their inspection tour through the pipeline. One must calculate the
level of  risk, taking into account the likelihood of corrosion and the
criticality of the consequences:
Corrosion Risk = Likelihood (Probability of corrosion)
× Consequence (Severity)  = CL ∗ Cof =  4  ∗ 3 =  12
The coloured risk matrix (as shown in Fig. 4) is  intended to  dis-
play that as  Probability of Failure (PoF) and Consequence of Failure
(CoF) increase, the risk becomes significant.
Then we compare this result on a  risk matrix to  determine
the type of risk level (low with green colour, medium with yel-
low colour and high with red colour). With a  likelihood having the
value 4 and a consequence having the value 3  and according to  this
coloured risk matrix, a  medium level of  risk is  shown.
The indicative information on the inspection plan is  provided in
Table 6. It can  be seen from this table that we can determine the
interval of the next inspection by smart instruments using elec-
tromagnetic acoustic transducers to  check for general condition,
potential failures and normal operation of  the pipelines. In our case
the level of  risk is average and value of  CL  is  4,  so the next inspection
by smart instruments will be in 4  years.
Domain experts also believed, in these cases based on personal
experience, that they would have to choose a  CL  with value 5  and a
consequence with value 5, because they took into account the fact
that there is no injection of a  corrosion inhibitor (catalyst) in  wells.
So with a CL having the value 5  and a  Cof having the value 5 they find
an interval of 2 years, but other parameters (such as the status of
other interconnected systems for example) are involved with their
associated impacts on inspection activities. Based on these circum-
stances, a specific intervention by the maintenance engineering is
Table 6
Indicative information on the inspection plan.
Corrosion risk =  High Corrosion risk = Medium Corrosion risk = Low
CL Interval CL Interval CL Interval
1 Max (15, Ti − T0) 1 Max (20, Ti − T0) 1 No inspection
2  10  2 12 2 15
3  5 3 8 3 10
4  3 4 4 4 5
5  2 5 3 5 Not applicable
at this moment not being planned; therefore the interval of  the
inspection plan is  reduced.
As  a result it is  considered that an interval of one year is the best
preventive plan  for pipeline inspection in  the case study.
7.  Discussion
As a  complement to  the explicit knowledge extracted from
available data and information that are regularly used in  the RBI
processes, it is indispensable to identify the implicit knowledge
applied by domain experts, and moreover the stepwise principles
of  problem-solving methods. In petroleum industry, as in  many
other complex domains, the part of  implicit knowledge in  the
expert problem-solving process has an important impact on the
results attained. Hence, the modelled experience feedback pro-
cesses integrate the description of more detailed explanation in
knowledge acquisition and interpretation problem-solving meth-
ods. In order to  acquire knowledge from experience feedback
processes, a  conceptual model (context, analysis, solution and les-
son learned) incorporating problem-solving methods to generate
explicit knowledge from practical experiences is presented in Fig. 5.
The principal categories of knowledge acquisition techniques
includes these five elements [31]: (i) Interviews with observations
and protocol analyses, (ii) Classification techniques for identi-
fication of  conceptual domain vocabulary, (iii) Exploitation of
recorded cases, (iv) Extraction of  associations rules, (v) Identi-
fication of  patterns of  reasoning. These recognized knowledge
acquisition techniques are operative in  revealing the rules and con-
straints underpinning the expert reasoning, so it is  possible to give
explicit outline and a  formal background to  knowledge compo-
nents deployed by domain experts. In fact, the explicit specification
of conceptual vocabularies of the experiences with the associated
problem solving methods meaningfully impacts the way in which
the  RBI takes place, as supported by  their influence in the formal-
ization of information and knowledge acquisition.
8.  Conclusion
Maintenance and inspection engineering is a  complex task  that
requires experienced knowledge to allow the good management
of  the requirements analysis, planning and inspection operations,
maintenance, repair or overhaul of  the considered system. Partic-
ularly, in the petroleum domain, the main target for the inspection
process is the management of  reliable system integrity so that
performance in  compliance with environmental and technical stan-
dards is efficiently retained through the system’s lifecycle.
In this document, we  describe a research approach using a  risk
based inspection methodology to improve the capability and asso-
ciated maintenance services concerning the effective functioning
of the technical systems in offshore production sites. The achieved
results with the proposed approach are  tangible since they allow
the  determination of thorough inspection of the pipelines and what
the optimum interval cycles are for the necessary inspection plan.
The proposed approach is applicable to the company discussed in
this paper and it is  also a generic method which can be applied
in any petroleum or O&G companies. It may be applied to other
systems or sectors of activities with sensitive components in  order
to inform them about the risk analysis that requires knowledge-
intensive tasks in the engineering field.
Knowledge acquisition and interpretation problem-solving
methods from experience feedback processes (e.g. valuable case
studies of expertise in sedimentary petrography [32])  can be
included in risk assessment of inspection planning. The use  of
previous information from similar contexts would improve the
anticipation of  future developments in complex systems in time.
The generated lessons learnt could make a  useful contribution to
the understanding of  failure prediction, and the time scales to reach
these failures and possibly including the study of the potential con-
sequences. This is to provide domain experts with a  database of
historical data on the considered system with its properties and
environmental constraints, taking into account the damage it has
sustained during ageing. Helped by such an  information base, the
expert has a  tool for risk analysis in which reference can be made
to determine the expected developments and mechanisms causing
damage and their sequence leading to the system failure (failure
scenarios). The criticality assessment of these scenarios in  terms of
occurrence, severity and detectability and the root cause analyses
allow to identify the most critical scenarios and predict the circum-
stances of  their occurrence. For instance, there are some established
procedures for safety assessment probabilities based on the eval-
uation of  German operational experience for piping systems with
different diameters [33].
Nevertheless, due to  the complexity and uncertainty of the refin-
ing and petrochemical units and risks, operational analyses are
difficult to achieve by  using risk techniques with classical logic [34].
Likewise, a  fuzzy logic framework can be engaged in  the establish-
ment of an  RBI programme for systems of the petroleum industry.
The advantage of  this approach lies in  its ability to include con-
textual experiences along with acceptable deterministic models in
the information processing [35]. Also the inspection management
department can order risk reduction decision makings using risk
prioritization of the asset failures [36]. Therefore the use of  appro-
priate methods and approaches, careful investigation during the
risk analysis phase, and its comprehensive and organized results
are essential to make proper risk-based inspection decisions [37].
Alternatively, a RBI methodology might be combined with
Multi-Objective Genetic Algorithm (MOGA) for defining efficient
inspection programmes in terms of  inspection costs and risk level
[38]. Finally, RBI could be included in a  larger framework; for
example, an approach giving multi-attribute decision-making with
aggregated risk  analysis [4] or experience feedback strategies
[41–44].
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